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To study selfish routing scenarios in networks we use and extend in this
thesis two well-known classes of games modeling such routing scenarios: network
congestion games and Wardrop games. In both games, we are given a network
with edge latency functions. In a network congestion game, each player selects
as its strategy one path from its origin to its destination node and experiences as
its private cost the sum of edge latencies on this path. In a Nash equilibrium, no
player can decrease its private cost by unilaterally deviating to another path.
In a Wardrop game, amounts of traffic are associated with pairs of network
nodes. The traffic from an origin to a destination node is modeled as a splittable
network flow and the cost on an origin-destination path is again given by the
sum of edge latencies on this path. In a Wardrop equilibrium, no fraction of the
traffic assigned to some path, however small, can decrease its cost by unilaterally
switching to another path.
This thesis is primarily concerned with network routing scenarios where the
players have incomplete information. One possibility to model such scenarios is
to assume that a player who does not know some relevant parameter of the game
is at least aware of a probability distribution over the possible outcomes of this
parameter. In such a setting, it is reasonable to assume that the decisions of a
player are based on the expected values of the unknown parameters. We apply
this approach for network routing games where the players have incomplete
information about the edge latency functions. Since each player obtains for
each edge his own expected latency function we get games with player-specific
latency functions. For both network congestion games and Wardrop games
with player-specific latency functions, we show positive and negative results
concerning the convergence to equilibria, the existence and polynomial-time
computability of equilibria. We also prove bounds on the so-called price of
anarchy that measures the worst-possible inefficiency of equilibria with respect
to a social welfare measure.
We use an incomplete information model different from the aforementioned
one for games where, in contrast to congestion games, the players do not know
each other’s weight. Based on Harsanyi’s incomplete information concept of
Bayesian games, each player in our Bayesian routing games has a set of possible
types and each type of a player corresponds to some weight. The players’ un-
certainty about each other’s weight is described by one probability distribution
over all possible type profiles that is known to all players. In this setting, we
focus on the price of anarchy, the existence and the computational complexity
of equilibria.
We also study in this thesis, as a complete information setting, bottleneck
games with splittable traffic where the latency on a path is given by themaximum
latency of an edge on this path. We characterize for which games the social
welfare of equilibria is unique and we give results on the price of stability that
measures the worst-possible inefficiency of the best equilibrium.
